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to 
this 
provision contained in the Judgment. He fails to demonstrate that the Trial Court 
acted within its discretion in enforcing penalty provision contained within the Stipulated 
Judgment. He also fails to demonstrate that the finding that Doug did not interfere with Vicki's 
ability to pay off the remainder of the Lapham debt was supported by the evidence admitted at 
trial. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
Doug's Assertion that the Standard of Review Requires that this Court Affirm the 
Trial Court is Meritless. 
Doug erroneously asserts applicable standard of review in this matter requires this 
Court to simply affirm the rulings. This is simply untrue. 
and presented viable issues at trial them in appeal. Doug appeal 
should be denied because Vicki "simply ask[ s] Court to second guess the Trial Court's 
findings of fact that: 1) enforcement the judgment is not an inequitable forfeiture; and, 2) that 
Douglas did not prevent [Vicki] from performing [her] obligations under the Judgment." First, it 
should be noted that many of the 
law or mixed questions of law 
fact, 
enforcing the damage 
was not 
raised by parties in this appeal involve questions of 
Vicki is not merely inviting the to second 
abused m 
not 
not 
is not 
District Court. 
asserts that Vicki did not argue at trial that Stipulated Judgment is 
unenforceable as a matter of law as it contains a forfeiture provision. On the contrary, this issue 
was raised during the evidentiary hearing (Tr. VoL £I, p. 325, 15-25; p. 326, 1-16), in the 
post trial briefing of both parties (R. Vol. II, p. 357; p. 363-364; p. 380-382; p. 412-416; R. Vol. 
p. 446-450; p. 462-464), in both parties' briefing on the motion for reconsideration, (R. VoL 
III, p. 498-50 I; p. 533-540) and in both of the memorandum decisions (R. Vol. III, p. 
569-570). Clearly, this issue was raised at trial. 
B. Doug's Lack of Transcripts Argument is Not Supported by Authority, and is 
Contrary to Existing Law. 
Doug argues that the record does not support Vicki's appeal, on the basis that did 
not transcripts from the hearing on Vicki's Motion for Reconsideration. a result, he 
this Court cannot determine what evidence was presented and must assume it would 
support the District Court's conclusions. First, it should be noted that no evidence was submitted 
at that hearing. The minutes from that hearing (R. Vol. III, p. 554-556) reveal that only oral 
argument was presented to the Court. Argument, 
is not evidence. 
The issues raised at that hearing were 
with the Trial written 
IS 
Doug's apparent belief to the contrary, 
briefed by both parties, and those briefs, 
are made 
473-474; p. 569-570). 
or or 
must 
In 
failed to 
to 
transcript of the 
v. Liddle & Moeller Const., the 
~~~~~~=~~=~=, 144 Idaho 171, 
1 158 P.3d 947, 948 (2007). This Court refused to consider claims on appeal because 
it was unable to determine what ev1ae11ce was presented to the Trial Id. at 1 949. 
This matter is distinguishable from Fritts because a clear record exists as to what 
evidence was or was not presented at trial. The relevant evidentiary transcripts were by 
submitted and even relied on by Doug this appeal. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1-95; Tr. Vol. II, p. 1-44; 
Vol. III, p. 1-488). Doug not submit authority showing that HH.,HHJ< and 
decisions are insufficient to a appeal. if Doug viewed 
transcript of that hearing as necessary to he had ample opportunity to 
transcripts 
manner. 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and failed to 
19, 29(a). Therefore, Doug's argument must be 
that right a 
to 
support her claim of error and, therefore, in accordance with Liberty Banker's Life Ins. Co. v. 
Witherspoon, 
the parties 
comply with Idaho 
~=~=.:, I 
Davenport 
on appeal about 
, this appeal not be considered. Liberty, 
1039 (2016). 
forfeiture at 
was for 
in Liberty, neither party 
at 69 , 1 
a 
case, rulings as 
clause constitutes an inequitable unenforceable penalty, and the Trial Court 
to make findings to support any ruling on 
received by Doug was reasonably the damages he suffered from the alleged breach. 
Liberty, therefore, has no precedential value to the issue before this Court 
Moreover, Vicki has in fact presented a record that discloses adverse rulings. (R. Vol. 
III, p. 466-476; 564-570). The ruled that Vicki's equitable defenses do not apply and that 
Doug did not interfere with Vicki's ability to perform. Additionally, these rulings were reduced 
to a final judgment by Doug. (R Vol. III, 572-574). Thus, Doug failed to demonstrate 
Vicki submitted an record and this case in stark contrast to 
Accordingly, this Court must consider the issues raised Vicki on appeal. 
C. The Rules of Equity Apply Equally to a Stipulated Judgment as to a Contract; 
Therefore, Doug's Argument that this Court Cannot Consider Equity with Regard 
to a Stipulated Judgment is Without Merit. 
In order to justify the Trial Court's failure to apply 
at issue in this case, Doug claims on appeal the Trial Court merely enforced unambiguous 
terms of a Judgment, rather than applied a forfeiture provision in a contract In support of this 
argument, Doug to Hull v. While from he 
misstates the scope of the holding. Although this Court in that case reversed an order enforcing a 
penalty clause as an because it was into the parties' agreement 
no progeny only to 
Id. at 779,521. 
as 
court could not impose 
Instead, upon any 
need to return to court for that court to ""'''""r,"" 
occurred, whether that 
Even if the district court could add forfeiture terms to the contract, 
the terms the court added impermissibly punish Giesler for not 
continuing the contract. Courts "refuse to enforce contract clauses 
that appear designed to deter a breach or to punish the breaching 
party rather than compensate the injured party damage 
occasioned by the breach." 1\1elaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho 
920,927,318 P.3d 910,917 (2014)(quotingA1agic Valley Truck 
Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 117, 982 945, 
(Ct.App.1999)). When forfeiture is "simply a penalty invoked as a 
result conduct of one of the forfeiture will not 
allowed." Foeller, 155 Idaho at 318 P.3d at 917 
(quotingFlemingv. Idaho 157,161,686 P.2d 837, 
841 (Ct.App.1984)). if Giesler breaches the 
contract, Giesler loses his development costs and the property 
be listed for sale. This seems designed to persuade to 
complete the contract, and therefore be an unenforceable 
penalty clause. 
This Court explained in that a judge cannot inject forfeiture into an 
agreement between litigants. Id. However, the went on to explain even that were 
permissible, the terms of such a clause carmot intended to punish a breaching party. Id. This 
prohibition applies to all contracts, not a court. 
Idaho at 927. ("Parties to an event of breach, but this power 
is not same 
in this appeaL that 
cases 
parties, none of cases dealt a court injecting a provision into the 
agreement. (involving the enforceability of a forfeiture provision contained within an 
employment agreement); Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc., 133 Idaho 110 (involving the 
enforcement of a damage provision contained within an employment agreement); Hardy v. 
McGill, 137 Idaho 280, 47 P.3d 1250 (2002) (involving a forfeiture provision contained within a 
contract for deed sale); and Fleming, 107 Idaho 157 (involving a forfeiture provision contained 
within a real property lease). These cases, which were cited as authority in Hull, all support 
Vicki's position that the Trial Court was required, but failed, to make findings as to whether the 
enforcement the forfeiture clause was an inequitable penalty, and that in order to that 
determination, the Court would need to make findings as to how much each party was damages 
by the alleged breach. 
Aside from the irrelevant distinction from Hull, Doug submits no other argument or 
authority for his position that the Court did not impose a forfeiture in this case. He to 
Vicki's claim that the Court appeared to acknowledge that the decision worked a forfeiture. In 
fact, Vicki had invested more than $236,000.00 into the subject property since the entry of the 
Mediated Settlement Agreement, Court's caused to 
investment. Without making findings as to how the alleged breach damaged Doug, and whether 
those damages were relatively commensurate with the amount to which was gaining from 
the forfeiture, the finding the clause was enforceable is reversible error. 
a 
Next, even was a forfeiture prov1s1on m the Stipulated 
Judgment, it was not inequitable for the support of this argument, Doug 
cites to Hull for the maxim that "although the law does not favor forfeitures, courts will 
uphold contracts expressly provide for forfeitures." Hull at 521, 779. as 
discussed above, Hull explicitly states that forfeiture provisions intended to function as a penalty 
against the breaching party will not be upheld. Id. at 522, 780. Doug completely ignores this 
rule, and his attempt to gloss over the body of law developed by Graves1 and its "'"'"-,-"''"'" 1s 
unavailing. He instead argues the only exceptions to the enforcement of a forfeiture 
provision are procedural irregularities such as the to provide adequate of an 
to declare forfeiture and that the party declaring forfeiture must not also be breach the 
agreement This argument simply ignores Hull and Graves, and should be similarly 
Doug then attempts to distinguish this case from other forfeiture cases arising from 
contract for deed transactions. He puts forward a of facts but fails to cite to the record 
support of those facts. For example, he claims Vicki made no attempt to perform her obligations 
under the Stipulated Judgment from May 2014 until the following year. The record clearly 
shows this assertion to be false. In addition to obtaining an updated Phase I survey, cleaning up 
the contamination on Lot 1, Vicki made a payment on the Lapham debt to Doug's attorney in the 
1 Doug's citation to Graves states that it was overruled by Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank. The Benz case only overruled 
Graves in part, specifically with respect to a party's ability to collect pre-judgment interest and other sums under a 
vendee 's lien. See Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 229, 268 P.3d 1167, 1181 (2012). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - l l 
4. to 
restore l to a condition 15, 
inside of the buildings on Lot 1, equipment to grade, and fill Lot 
1, and bring in gravel. Vol. III, 319-323). 
In addition to his failure to submit any factual basis for the alleged distinction between 
case and other contract for deed transactions, Doug submits no legal demonstrating 
the significance of this distinction, if indeed there is one. This Court does "not consider an issue 
not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, l Idaho 
524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008); see also Idaho App. 35(a)(6) ("The argument shall 
contain the contentions of the appellant respect to the issues 
reasons therefor, citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the the record 
relied upon. Because Doug has failed to support 
should not be considered by the Court. 
Finally, Doug uses this section of Reply Brief as an opportunity to argue the 
of facts that were admitted at trial solely for background nnrnr.c As argued at 
trial and in Vicki's opening brief, it was error for the Trial Court to rely on any testimony in its 
decisions regarding events or agreements between the parties occurring prior to the execution of 
the Stipulated Judgment. Nor should reasons set forth 
in Vicki's opening brief and in Paragraph I, below. 
E. Doug's Assertion that the Rules of Equity Cannot be Applied Where a Party is in 
Default Contradicts, and would Overrule, Binding Idaho Precedent. 
argues as a matter of is not entitled to relief 
was even as 
terms 
Judgment before being allowed to 
must show that she attempted to comply, or 
submit any case law stating 
equitable measures prior to 
ruling. Consequently, and in accordance with Jorgensen, this argument should not be 
considered by the Court. 
If the Court does consider this argument, Doug nevertheless fails provide any logical 
argument as to why Graves should not apply to a in breach. To the contrary, Graves 
appears to exist for the purpose of preventing the imposition of unfair damage awards against a 
breach, in addition to on from making such provisions part 
it appears that nearly of the cases which consider 
or liquidated damages provision in a contract is enforceable in equity, a 
been alleged. If there had not a breach, there would be no 
provision, and no reason for the Court to consider whether the forfeiture 
unenforceable penalty. Doug's argument in 
principles of law in [daho. 
regard ignores 
a 
was an 
established 
Just as Doug fails to set forth any legal for the argument that Vicki is not entitled to 
never disputed that 
it came due, 
a 
to submit any 
was unable to 
did that shortly 
as 
at the 
it became due was to amount 
refused to allow 
31, 14 
Lapham debt, including Vicki's remaining portion. (Plaintiff's 5-7). 
record shows Doug took out the new loan without any notice to Vicki. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 239 L 4-
1 313, 4-6). Thus, Vicki was not allowed an opportunity to cure the default upon which 
Doug declared a forfeiture of Vicki's interest in Lot 2. By paying off Vicki's half of the Lapham 
debt with no notice or opportunity to cure, Doug made Vicki's performance of that obligation 
impossible after December 3 I, 2014 when the loan closed. Doug should not be permitted to 
argue that Vicki's failure to cure the default or tender payment in the period between January I, 
2015 and the evidentiary hearing tends to show that she acted Doug unilaterally 
31, 2014 the terminating 
remaining obligations. 
Doug also argues that Vicki never sought specific performance as a means of 
the Judgment. Doug fails to submit authority demonstrating a requirement that a party seek 
specific performance as a condition precedent to the application of the defense 
inequitable forfeitures, or submit any logical reason why the same should be 
accordance with Jorgensen, the Court should not consider this issue. 
F. Doug's Assertion that Vicki is not Entitled to Relief on the Grounds of Unclean 
Hands is not Supported by the Findings of the Court or the Record. 
In section 4 of Doug's brief, he argues that Vicki had unclean hands, and 
appropriate the Trial to equitable relief. However, the 
to be in 
it not 
In 
or 
Doug fails to to record or authority demonstrating that Vicki acted 
inequitably, , dishonestly, fraudulently, or deceitfully. Here Doug relies on 
irrelevant testimony regarding claims and occurred prior to parties reaching 
mediation a Mediated Settlement Agreement which was subsequently converted to a 
Stipulated Judgment. As set forth Vicki's opening brief and Section I below, these claims 
and defenses should not have been considered by the Trial Court and should not be considered 
this Court. Therefore, the only relevant facts submitted by Doug as evidence Vicki's 
unclean hands are failure to pay the remainder of 
to fully vacate Lot 1. no support for 
unclean hands. Thus, Doug has failed to support the 
relief. Consonant with Jorgensen, the Court should not consider 
Doug also argues in this section his Brief that 
ore,1cn of contract 
or authority 
from seeking equitable 
issue. 
an adequate remedy at law, 
and her failure to pursue that remedy prohibits her seeking equitable relief. Specifically, he 
argues that Vicki's remedy was to comply with the terms of Stipulated Judgment This 
is The opportunity to terms 
not an 'adequate remedy at law.' An adequate is the right to sue for and collect 
damages a wrongdoer.2 When damages would an inadequate or to ascertain, a 
does not an 
"""''.,-"',.., an equitable defense to Doug's motion to forfeit. Doug fails to provide authority for 
the argument that a party may not assert an equitable defense when they failed to an 
adequate remedy at law. Pursuant to Jorgensen, supra, the Court should not consider this issue. 
G. The Trial Court Failed to Make the Necessary Findings of Fact to Support any 
Finding as to Whether the Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated Judgment was an 
Inequitable Penalty. 
Next, Doug argues that the Trial Court employed the correct legal analysis in its decision 
to impose the forfeiture. He claims that Trial Court did not refuse to consider Vicki's 
That claim is in contrast to the language of the memorandum decisions. In first 
and must be enforced by the court, that the substantial compliance 1s not a 
sufficient defense to Doug's motion to title, and "[hJaving reached this conclusion, the 
Court shall not address any of [Vicki's] other equitable arguments." (R. Vol. III, p. 474) 
( emphasis added). After Vicki moved the Trial Court to reconsider that conclusion, the second 
memorandum decision stated "the cases on land sale contracts cited by [Vicki] are not applicable 
to the instance (sic) case because there is no underlying contract here." (R. Vol. III, p. 570). 
Graves and progeny were developed within the context land contracts and 
is available when 
3 See e.g., ~'-'-==-=-'-==--'..:..=o~"-'==-"===, Cir. l relief is 
available 
not UIJIJH,cUU 
because it is unclear Court applied the 
or refused to apply the Graves analysis following the Reconsideration, we 
can 
findings 
look to the second memorandum decision to see whether the Trial Court 
necessary findings that would be required under Graves. Doug argues that the 
Court's analysis was appropriate and all equitable factors were properly considered. However, 
examination of the decision, it appears 
damages occasioned to Doug, many of 
the vast of the findings only referenced 
occurring prior to the entry of the 
Judgment. The Trial Court made note only one by Vicki, of $80,000. (R. Vol. III. 
ev1ae11ce from trial more than 
that. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 320, 1 Defendant's Trial Court not 
make findings or discuss these payments at 
a finding as to the total amounts to be 
occasioned to Doug. (Vol III, p 502-503). The 
specifically asked the Trial Court to 
by Vicki and the total amount damages 
Court failed to such 
Without those findings, we cannot determine the sums forfeited by Vicki were reasonably 
related to damages suffered by Doug. Here, the Magistrate made no specific finding 
concemmg 
the absence of 
at 
Judgment was 
Doug. 
Additionally, the Trial Court completely 
amount by 
to 
to consider whether forfeiture 
provision was exorbitant or arbitrary. The Trial Court found that the provision was not 
unconscionable, but gave no explanation for that conclusion. Without these findings, there is no 
for the Trial Court to determine whether the provision was intended as a penalty and thereby 
These are required findings under Graves, and it was error to refuse to 
such findings. fact, the Trial Court never considered whether the was a penalty. 
Trial Court's or refusal to make necessary findings and apply the appropriate 
legal analysis under Graves also an abuse of 
or provide argument explaining how the 
Doug fails to submit 
was consistent with 
Graves. He does not argue that the provision was not a penalty, unconscionable, or exorbitant. 
Therefore, Doug's assertion that the Trial Court's analysis was correct should not be considered. 
Doug provides no authority for the argument that forfeiture language is permissible 
simply because Vicki was represented by counsel at the time entered into the Stipulated 
as mandated not consider this 
not dispose of delineated 
as as suggested by 
prov1s1on. Doug fails to res1Don,ct to 
merely rests upon the Trial Court's uu~ .. ,F,0 and conclusions. 
the Court should not consider this claim. 
mandated 
H. The Issues of Waiver and Judicial Estoppel were Properly Raised. 
Doug's assertion that Vicki is raising the issue of waiver for first 
untrue. Vicki raised this issue in her post-trial brief, and specifically asked 
ruling on this issue, and Doug to argument in his 
Vol. II, p. 377-380; 406-410). properly raise an issue on appeal 
adverse ruling court below or the must have been raised 
cannot for the first on appeal." 
but 
on appeal is 
Trial Court for a 
(R 
an 
Idaho 118, 12 44 P.3d I 173, 1176-77 (2002). Because this was raised in court 
below, it has been preserved for appeal. 
Doug argues that he did not waive to declare can 
established by proof of an affirmative act demonstrating an intention to one's right or 
advantage. He argues that his conduct, in routinely accepting Vicki's late oai,rm,ents. not 
amount to 
definition of 
a 
support 
According to 
act 
this Doug to a 
case, "[w]aiver is a voluntary, relinquishment 
1S a question 
Waiver wm not be inferred except from a clear 
an to or to 
conduct in accepting Vicki's 
vUJ,vUL>-U on a late payment 
Doug fails to explain how course of conduct 
action that Doug's course 
right to declare a 
repeatedly accepting Vicki's late 
payments did not result in a waiver. he attempts to show that Vicki failed to explain 
her 'conclusion' that the payments reflected Defendant's Exhibit C were late. This argument 
is disingenuous, particularly because himself argued, in his Post-Trial Reply Brief, in 
opposition to Vicki's argument that Doug had waived compliance with the terms 
Stipulated Judgment, that "[ w ]hile it is true [Vicki] was late in [her] payments, 
consistently been 
Mediated Settlement Agreement," that "[t]here were 
but all payments were relayed to escrow as soon as 
that were made late by [Vicki], 
and 1s no the 
record to the contrary," and that "Vicki was making payments from October to March." 
(R. II, p. 407). These conflicting positions implicate the of judicial estoppeL 
Judicial estoppel is the concept a litigant who obtains a judgment, advantage, or 
consideration from one party through means sworn statements is judicially estopped from 
a or a 
against another party, arising out the same transaction or matter." Heinze v. Bauer, 
Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 
P.2d I, (1954)). It one 
action. 
by 
~~~' 145 Idaho at 178 P.3d at 600. 
a party from taking opposing positions to gain an 
a 
litigation. 
Although it would be difficult to demonstrate that Doug gained any specific advantage 
outcome of trial as a direct result of his argument that payments were 
should not be permitted to argue now that Vicki's payments were not late to ex1genc1es 
this appeal. Thus, Court should not consider Doug's argument that Vicki's failed to 
that her payments were late and that Doug accepted 
Defendant's ~a.,u~ .. C clearly shows late fees were ass:es:,eu on 
Doug's was subsequently to the escrow 
July 2014. 
Doug would have this Court ignore that intent may be 
because, in actuality, his conduct amounted to 
"'<.HUvL,c, or authority demonstrating that he did not 
with the terms of the Stipulated Judgment. Although he points to his 
payments. 
made to 
in April, 2014 to 
declare a forfeiture by filing a Motion to Quiet Title, acknowledges that the basis for that 
was to vacate 1 March 31, 
demonstrate that was going to require strict compliance 
his v=1-=va,~ to April, 2014 
of evidence forward by 
to 
deadlines is not 
not intend to 
not how these on 
demanded strict compliance with her obligation to make timely payments, nor is there language 
within the describing the result that would occur if Vicki failed to pay off her share 
the Lapham by October 15, 20 To the contrary, Plaintiffs Exhibit actually 
contemplates a one year extension of the payoff date to October 15, 2015. It is unclear how 
these Exhibits may be construed to give Vicki reasonable notice that Doug intended to declare a 
forfeiture, much how they provide Vicki with a reasonable opportunity to cure the 
delinquent payments. Doug submits no evidence to show that he Vicki notice of his 
intent to declare a or that he provided her with a reasonable opportunity before doing 
so. For this reason, he should be held to 
Aside from arguing that Vicki 
waiver. 
that Vicki to submit a legal basis for 
to raise this issue prior to the appeal, Doug asserts 
claim that Doug waived his right to declare a 
forfeiture. Again, this argument is without merit Vicki clearly cited Sullivan v. Burcaw and 
King v. Seebeck, cases which establish right to declare a forfeiture may be waived by 
engaging in a course of conduct that is inconsistent with strict performance, and that such waiver 
may only be cured by reasonable notice and opportunity to cure. It is unclear Doug believes 
does not a legal Doug even included same 
citation to King that Vicki provided.4 Although he acknowledges that Vicki had a pattern of 
non-compliance, he that he was not to put Vicki on that he would require 
4 [t 
word 'Respondent' were 
with LA.R. and minimize references to 
notice to so, to make the 
delinquent payments. Sullivan v. Burcaw, 35 Idaho 755, 763, 208 P. 841, (1922). 
does not argue that Sullivan is to this case, and he fails to submit evidence that 
Vicki any notice of his intention to forfeiture her rights under the Stipulated Judgment or 
that he gave her a reasonable opportunity to do so. Rather, he argues that she should have 
would forfeit her rights for the 
this argument with any factual basis. 
to make 
this Court should find that Doug was unable to 
a forfeiture because he had requirement Vicki make 
I. The Trial Court Erred by Considering Evidence of Events which Occurred Prior to 
the Stipulated Judgment. 
It is Vicki's position herein that the 
Doug disagrees, but fails to put forward 
considered testimony regarding the 
Court not consider the 
as that settlement resolved all up to that point 
for his argument that the court 
Lapham debt, unpaid taxes, 
that were at issue prior to mediation. Ironically, Doug argues that it is Vicki that failed to 
argument or authority in this 
First, Vicki argued at 
p. 
IS 
Stipulated Judgment (R. I, p. 95). 
under the statute of frauds. 
for 
for background purposes so 
Stipulated Judgment. Doug fails to 
accordance with Jorgensen, supra, the Court 
this testimony was not relevant to the at 
understand how the came to 
to m 
not consider Doug's argument that 
Had the Trial Court ruled that the testimony was admissible for all purposes, Vicki would 
taken that opportunity to submit evidence 
lease agreement. 
own regarding her the 
J. The Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated Judgment is Arbitrary. 
Doug next that was not Doug to 
submit or authority to support out 
was because it or circumstances 
surrounding Doug's actual damages. Because is enforceable for any breach of the 
Stipulated Judgment, no matter how slight, it is an ~"'""·~, 
and its progeny. Graves states that "if a forfeiture is simply a 
conduct of one of parties, the forfeiture will not 
or that a VV<c'U'-"'VS 
party is in material breach. Thus, Doug's argument 
to 
it cannot was compensating Doug 
was 
disallowed by 
as a result the 
forward no authority 
accordance with Doe. 
damages, 
0u0uu,, ... u by Vicki's 
was not 
was arbitrary. enforcing the 
the Trial 
damages. 
K. Doug's Interference with Vicki's to Refinance the Lapham Debt, and 
Therein Satisfy her Duties Under the Stipulated Judgment, Precluded Doug from 
Enforcing that Agreement, and the Trial Court's Findings to the Contrary are not 
Supported by the Record. 
It is undisputed that Doug 
interests under the Stipulated Judgment 
does not a violation of the 
Echoing the Trial Court, he 
he was imminent foreclosure 
foreclosure was imminent Doug 
Lapham's attorney, Rex Finney. 
declared a forfeiture of of Vicki's rights and 
and fair 
was forced to 
Joe Lapham. however, no evidence 
claims that page l l of transcript 
demonstrate that Mr. Finney was prepared to proceed with the foreclosure deadline 
1 and Mr. Finney communicated as much to counsel for Doug. That on 
page 17 4, lines 1-8 of the trial transcript. it 
note that was owed to 
not demonstrate that Mr. 
In immediately thereafter, Mr. Finney while still under 
examination by Doug's attorney, that a foreclosure was not«""""~' 
Featherston) Q: Okay. And it was about 
the deadline. 
the 
(Mr. Finney) A: Yeah. We were discussing an ~,.,,~u0n.,u of 
and my client had not started foreclosure. 
Q: Okay. On November I It\ 201 you me (counsel for 
Doug) a voice mail, did you not, that stated wanted to 
what the status was and did you not also ask '""'1.,,-.c,,. or not I could 
accept service on a foreclosure? 
A: Well, I called you, left a message that I wanted to talk to you 
about extending, or if we're not gonna agree to 
gonna represent your client in the foreclosure. 
Q: Okay. 
A: But there was nothing to actually accept 
Q: Okay. 
A: No Notice of Default, although the note was due. 
Q: Did you and I ever talk about the foreclosure, 
A: Just to the extent that if it went to foreclosure 
see what your 
or not. 
Vol. III, p. 175, L 1 
as 
at that 
you can 
and 
1 
a foreclosure was 
loan was so urgent that he not 
an 
is no evidence that 
time to Vicki 
refinance the loan or give her a reasonable opportunity to pay off 
before Doug took out a second loan on the property to pay off the Lapham 
to pay 
his intention to 
obligation 
Doug misconstrues Vicki's argument with respect to the duty to cooperate. He claims 
that Doug should not have transferred the to 2 to Vicki because she had not paid off her 
half of the Lapham debt Vicki's been consistent 
Doug had transferred Lot 2 to Vicki, even at the a refinance, would have 
Because had a at 
have allowed Lot 2 to be pledged as collateral require that it 
transferred to Vicki that process. the from 
no reason for Doug to prevent this comply 
with the demands listed in his August 
shows, and the Trial Court found, that 
letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). However, the 
Stipulated did not require 
u"'"'-'-'H·'" found in that to to 
Lot 2, the only material breach was the failure to pay off 
her debt and the vacate Lot I . III, If Doug's 
had to r,ar+."'"'"" on 
and constructing a new 
Doug calls his testimony about insisting that Vicki build a new road before 
title a red herring. It is not a red herring. The requirement to build a new road was not of 
the Stipulated Judgment. Doug testified that when Vicki would ask for the deed, he ask 
when she was going to build the road. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 392, L. 12-22). At the hearing on Doug's 
interference with Vicki's ability to comply with the judgment, Doug's attorney argued that Vicki 
was required to build a road (Tr. Vol. II, p. 9, L. 23-25; p. 10-14). Rex Finney testified that 
had heard Vicki had to build a road before title would be transferred. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 179, L 
23). Doug's 2ih letter gives Vicki a deadline for and imposes conditions on the 
construction of the (Plaintiff's 4). It is clear, therefore, that was determined 
to have Vicki build an alternate access to Lot 2 before he would consider title to her, 
despite the fact that transferring title would allow her to pay off the remainder her share of the 
Lapham debt and construct alternate access. Additionally, one the reasons Vicki did not 
build the road was because she did not have title to Lot 
Finally, Doug has repeated at every stage of this lawsuit that there is no evidence that Joe 
Lapham would made a loan to Vicki. This assertion is simply untrue and was refuted by 
m 
Lapham, Vicki Visser, Rex Finney, and Margaret Williams, stating that Joe Lapham would have 
loaned Vicki the 
128-1 p. l 
4 
had Doug agreed to let Vicki use Lot 2 as collateral. (Tr. III, p. 
· p. 254, 1-25, 1-23; p. 308, L.17-25; L. 1-20; p.392, 
asserts 
fees with argument and 
was entitled to fees on appeal, and, as authority this 
to 
contrary, argued 
to the Stipulated Judgment, which provides an award of attorneys fees to the prevailing party 
in any to enforce the terms of thereof Obviously, this an action to enforce terms 
the Stipulated Judgment, should Vicki prevail herein, she should be awarded reasonable 
fees. Doug appears to argue that it was necessary that Vicki cite to Appellate Rule 41. 
cases cited by Doug support of this argument state Rule 41 is not a basis for 
Although he acknowledges a rule from ==~-'---"'-~-==-=~"'-'-'-~~, 149 Idaho 
240 583, 590 (2010) are awardable only where they are 
statute or contract," Doug claims that Vicki was required to do more. She was not to 
do anything more than tell the 1S to attorneys 
Judgment) and her basis therefore she prevails, contract her to costs and fees). 
V. CONCLUSION 
For foregoing reasons, Vicki respectfully request that the Court reject the claims and 
defenses put forward by Doug and reverse decision Court. 
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